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AND  WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT  IT?
LucIAN ARYE BEBCHUKt
AND  MARCEL  KAHAN*
INTRODUCTION
Fairness opinions have become a regular feature of every major cor-
porate control transaction.  Whether in negotiated  mergers,1  freeze-out
mergers, 2  hostile  tender  offers, 3  friendly  tender  offers,4  self-tenders,5
leveraged buyouts,6 negotiated share repurchases, 7 or negotiated sales of
treasury  stock,8  directors seek the blessing of investment banks before
approving  transactions  or  adopting  defensive  measures.  These  banks
give their blessings in the form of fairness opinions, which usually consist
of short letters that state an opinion about whether a proposed transac-
tion is "fair" or "adequate."9  In addition, the banks often give presenta-
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1.  See, e-g. Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821-22 (D. Del. 1974).
See generally Chazen, Fairness  from a Financial  Point of fVew  in Acquisitions of Public Companies:
Is "7ird  Party Sale Value" the Appropriate  Standard?,  36 Bus. LAw.  1439, 1442-43 (1981)  (fairness
opinions commonplace  in merger transactions).
2.  See, ag., Anderson v.  Boothe,  103 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Minn.  1984); Gerstle  v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc.,  298 F. Supp. 66, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modifed  478 F.2d  1281 (2d  Cir. 1973);  Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,  707-08  (Del.  1983).
3.  See, eg., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS  Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (poison
pill proposal), rev'd, 481 U.S.  69 (1987);  Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,  781 F.2d
264, 271 (2d Cir. 1986) (lock-up  option); Unocal  Corp. v.  Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d  946, 950
(Del. 1985) (rejected tender offer);, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc.,  501 A.2d  1239,
1243 (Del  Ch.  1985) (purchase rights issue), aff'd, 506 A.2d  173 (Del.  1986).
4.  See, eg.,  Danziger v. Kennecott  Copper Corp.,  N.Y.L.J.,  Dec. 7,  1977,  at 7,  col.  1.
5.  See, eg., Kahn  v. United  States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op.  at 3-5  (Del. Ch. Dec.  10,
1985) (Westlaw,  1985 WL 4449).
6.  See, e ,  Herskowitz  v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d  179,  190  (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct.  1315 (1989);  Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578  F. Supp.  1128,  1135  (D. Or.  1984).
7.  See, eg., Kaplan  v. Goldsamt,  380 A.2d 556,  561  (Del.  Ch.  1977).
8.  See, e-g.,  Treadway  Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,  365  (2d Cir.  1980).
9.  See. eg.  Crouse-Hinds  Co. & Belden  Corp.,  Joint Proxy  Statement  exhs.  C-E  (Oct.  14,
1980)  (merger is "fair and equitable"; merger is "fair from a financial  point of view"; tender offer isDUKE  LAW  JOURNAL
tions to boards of directors in which the banks justify and explain their
opinions.1 0
One reason  why  corporate  directors  obtain  fairness  opinions  is to
help persuade shareholders to approve transactions.II  More importantly,
however, directors obtain fairness opinions in order to satisfy their fiduci-
ary obligations.12  Indeed, courts have indicated that they give weight to
fairness opinions in their analyses  of fiduciary obligation.  For example,
in Tanzer Economic  Associates Profit  Sharing  Plan  v.  Universal  Food  Spe-
cialties, Inc.,  a New York court relied on a fairness opinion obtained by
the defendants,  concluding  that "[i]t  is apparent that [the  teims of the
freeze-out constitute]  no palpable or gross undervaluation,  which on its
face  would  shock  the conscience  of the  Court."' 3  In Cottle v.  Storer
Communication,  Inc.  the Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]he  fact that the
board consulted  [an investment bank]  simply weighs in favor of finding
that the directors did not abuse their discretion."'1 4  And in Smith v.  Van
Gorkom, the court, in holding that the directors  violated their duty  of
care, emphasized  the directors'  failure to obtain a fairness opinion.' 5
This Article analyzes the problems with judicial reliance on fairness
opinions and considers the extent to which courts should give weight to
such opinions.  One aim of the Article is constructive-to suggest a judi-
cial approach that may improve the reliability  of fairness opinions;  an-
"inadequate  from a financial  point of view");  Alleghany Corp. & Investors Diversified Servs.  Inc.,
Joint Proxy Statement annexes III, IV (Mar. 29, 1979)  (merger is "fair from a financial  standpoint"
and "fair from a financial point of view,"  respectively); UOP Inc., Proxy Statement app. D (May  5,
1978) (merger is "fair and equitable").
10.  See, eg., Lipton,  TakeoverBids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw.  101,  126 (1979)
(banker provides detailed analysis-and procedures used to develop fairness opinion), see also Gerstle
v. Gnamble-Skogmo,  Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 83 (E.D.N.Y.  1969) (bank discloses financial data used in
fairness opinion), modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946,  950 (Del.  1985) (same).  But see Hanson Trust  PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition,  Inc.,  781
F.2d 264, 275-76  (2d Cir.  1986) (conclusory  opinion; no documentary  support provided).
11.  See, eg.,  Denison Mines  Ltd. v. Fibreboard  Corp.,  388 F. Supp.  812,  821 (D. Del.  1974)
(independence  and  reputation  of investment  banker  adds  persuasive  support  for  management's
position).
12.  See Chazen, supra note  1, at  1442;  Fischel,  The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case  40 Bus. LAw.  1437,  1453  (1985);  Note, Investment Bankers'Fairness  Opinions in Cor-
porate Control Transactions, 96 YALE  L.J.  119,  120-21  (1986).
13.  87 Misc. 2d  167,  178,  383 N.Y.S.2d  472, 481  (Sup. Ct.  1976).
14.  849 F.2d  570, 578  (1lth Cir. 1988).
15.  488 A.2d 858, 876-78 (Del.  1985); see also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384
(2d  Cir. 1980)  (fairness opinion evaluating merger  proposal shows good faith); Kors v. Carey,  158
A.2d  136,  141  (Del. Ch.  1960)  (use  of outside experts  factor  in finding  absence of misconduct);
Alpert  v.  28  Williams St. Corp.,  63  N.Y.2d  557,  572,  473  N.E.2d  19,  27,  483  N.Y.S.2d  667,  676
(1984) (dictum) (fairness opinion  good proof that freeze-out price fair);, Danziger v. Kennecott Cop-
per Corp., N.Y.LJ.,  Dec. 7,  1977, at 7, col. 1 (obtaining independent  financial advice before making
tender offer factor  in holding that directors  discharged fiduciary  duties).
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other is critical-to show the limitations of possible improvements  and,
accordingly, to warn against excessive reliance on fairness  opinions.
The  first  two  parts  of  this  Article  systematically  analyze  the
problems  with fairness  opinions.  Part I shows  that investment  banks
possess significant discretion in issuing fairness opinions.  One source of
this discretion lies in alternative definitions of "fair price."  Another lies
in the alternative  ways of measuring fair price,  however  defined.  As a
result,  investment banks have  a choice  among several widely  disparate
estimates of fair price, all of which are justifiable.
Part H examines the conflicts of interest that investment banks face
in issuing fairness opinions.  Conflicts of interest derive from the invest-
ment banks' fee structure, from their desire to retain and attract clients,
and possibly  also from the bankers'  psychological loyalty to managers.
These conflicts encourage investment banks to render the opinions most
conducive to the interests of the managers that hired them, and iot those
that best reflect  the bankers'  genuine  beliefs.  This part further  argues
that neither reputational concerns nor internal procedures and guidelines
will significantly diminish this problem.
Part IH suggests a judicial approach to fairness opinions.  This ap-
proach describes how courts should scrutinize the definition of fairness,
the measurement of fair price, and the banker-company  relationship; the
approach  also suggests  that courts  should exercise  substantial  residual
caution and limit their reliance on fairness opinions.
I.  THE PROBLEM  OF  DISCRETION
In this part, we show that investment banks possess substantial dis-
cretion in determining what prices are "fair"  to shareholders.  Because of
this discretion, investment banks can arrive at widely differing estimates
of "fair price,"  all of which would be reasonable and none of which could
be shown  to be "wrong"  (or unfair) under objective criteria.1 6  That fi-
nancial analysts can regard widely differing figures as "fair"  is problem-
atic for  two  reasons.  First, the  subjective  nature  of fairness  opinions
reduces  their  value.  Even  if an investment  bank rendered  an  opinion
based on its genuine beliefs about fair price, that would be just one bank's
opinion.  Since other analysts could (legitimately)  arrive at very different
opinions, no single opinion  should receive excessive weight.17
16.  See, eg., Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 339 (DeL Ch. 1984) (estimates ranging from
$53 to S85 per share);, Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp.,  No. 7313, slip op. at 18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10,
1985)  (Westlaw,  1985  WL 4449)  (from $52  to $122);  Kaplan  v. Goldsamt,  380 A.2d  556,  566-67
(Del.  Ch.  1977)  (from S7.25  to $9.50).
17.  A possible solution to this problem is to obtain  more than one fairness opinion.  See.  eg.,
Brunswick Corp., Proxy Statement (Mar. 9,  1977) (charter amendment providing that certain trans-
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Second,  and  more importantly,  this discretion  enables  investment
banks to  act opportunistically.  Investment  bankers  can formulate fair-
ness opinions serving their and the managers' interests,  rather than ones
reflecting their best judgments of fair price.  And, as the next part points
out, investment banks have strong incentives  to write opinions  that sat-
isfy the managers  who hire them and negotiate their fees.
Investment banks' discretion in fashioning fairness opinions derives
from two main sources.  First, as section A  argues, the  concept of fair
price is  ill-defined.  Second,  as  section  B shows,  even  financial analysts
who use the same definition of fairness can differ  in their assessments of
fair price, because of the subjective nature of the estimation process.
A.  The Definitional Problem
Underlying the differences in analysts'  fair-price estimates is a con-
ceptual confusion about the definition of fair price."'  Courts have failed
to  specify which definition of fair price investment  banks should  use,19
and investment banks generally do not disclose which  definition of fair
price they have used;20 their fairness opinions simply state that prices are
"fair from a financial point of view" 21 or "inadequate."  Different  defi-
nitions can,  however, lead  to significantly  different  estimates.23  Since a
variety ofjustitlable definitions of fair price have been proposed, this defi-
nitional problem  can be quite complex.
In addition, the suitability of any one definition depends on the kind
actions be found fair by two independent investment banks).  Even multiple fairness opinions,  how-
ever, might  not provide  much information,  because of the potentially wide  discrepancies  in price
estimates.  Furthermore, shareholders  must bear the higher costs of multiple  opinions.
18.  Fair price is sometimes defined as the price at which a rational buyer with knowledge of the
relevant  facts would  sell the shares  in an arm's-length  transaction.  See Nathan  & Shapiro, Legal
Standard  of  Fairness  of Merger  Terms Under  Delaware  Law, 2 DEL 3. CORP.  L.  44,48 (1977).  This
definition, however, begs  the question:  different rational buyers might consider different definitions
of fair  price appropriate.
19.  See, e-g.,  Kahn  v. United  States Sugar Corp.,  No. 7313,  slip op. at 29  (Del.  Ch.  Dec.  10,
1985) (Westlaw,  1985  WL 4449) (court declined opportunity  to specify appropriate  definition of fair
price);  Joseph v. Shell Oil Co.,  482 A.2d  335, 343-45  (Del.  Ch.  1984)  (same).
20.  But cf.  Kaplan, 380 A.2d at 563-64 (board compared fairness of price in negotiated  share
repurchase to cost of shares in tender offer).
21.  See, e-g.,  Crouse-Hinds  Co. & Belden  Corp., supra note 9, exh.  D.  Even  practitioners do
not always know what "from a financial  point of view" means. See Chazen, Friedman & Feuerstein,
Premiums and Liquidation  Values"  Their Effect on  the Fairness  of an Acquisition, in  ELEVENTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE  ON SECURITIES  REGULATION  143,  156 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton & R. Steven-
son eds.  1980) (statement  of Joseph Flom).
22.  Cf  I  M.  LIFrON  &  E.  STEINBERGER,  TAKEOVERS  AND  FRErazE-ouTs  § 6.01[l[c][i]
(1988)  (recommending that investment bank simply "opine as to the adequacy of the price offered").
23.  See, e.g..  Joseph, 482 A.2d at 339  (different definitions resulted in estimates of $53,  S80-85,
and 591  per share); Kaplan, 380 A.2d  at 556-67  (different  definitions  resulted  in estimates ranging
from S7.25  to 58.25  per share).Vol.  1989:27]  FAIRNESS OPINIONS  31
of transaction at issue 2 4 and the particular context of that transaction.2 5
Take,  for example,  a company  facing an acquisition  offer.  The  buyers
might seek to acquire the company through a merger, a friendly tender
offer, or a hostile tender offer.  In this acquisition context, commentators
have suggested a variety of definitions of fair price.  First, fair price could
refer to the value of the company as an independent entity-i.e., its value
if it does not engage in the proposed acquisition or any other.26  One may
seek to justify this definition of value as being most relevant to the choice
facing  the  shareholders:  should  they  approve  the merger,  tender  the
shares,  and receive  the value  offered,  or  should  they reject the merger
and (at least for the moment) remain an independent  entity?
Second, some have suggested that fair price should be defined as the
value shareholders would receive if their company  were auctioned off to
the highest  bidder.27  While  shareholders  do not necessarily  have  this
choice,  there  is  no reason  in  principle  why  a company  should not be
auctioned off if that would enable shareholders to obtain a higher price.
Consequently, any price below the value that shareholders would receive
in an auction is arguably  "unfair"  to the shareholders.
A third  definition  of fair  price might  be the  value  that bilateral,
arm's-length  bargaining  would  yield.28  This value  is useful  because  it
24.  See, eg.  Chazen, supra note  1, at 1443-50 (proposing  different fairness standards for non-
negotiated acquisitions by controlling shareholders, negotiated acquisitions by controlling sharehold-
ers, and acquisitions by unaffiliated purchasers).  Making the definition of fair price dependent on the
type  of transaction  in question  poses  the danger  that banks  will  manipulate  definitions  to favor
management.  For example, an opinion that the terms of a merger are fair apparently means that the
price is within a range of fair prices, but not the highest price attainable.  See Chazen, Friedman &
Feuerstein, supra note 21, at  147.  But an opinion that the terms of a hostile takeover bid are inade-
quate merely signifies that, even though the terms are fair, better terms can be obtained.  See Weiss,
The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six,  4 CARDozo  L. REv.
245,  256 (1983).
25.  Cf  Saffer, Touching All Bases in Setting Merger Pices,  MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,  Fall
1984,  at 42 (discussing which valuation  method bidders should use in which context).
26.  Sea e'g. Schwartz,  The Fairness  of Tender Offer Prices  in Utilitarian Theory, 17 L LEGAL
STUD.  165,  165-67 (1988).  Because Schwartz believes  that a company's independent value  is given
by the market price of its shares, he probably  would see no  need for fairness opinions written  by
bankers.  If a company's shares  are not publicly  traded  or if the share  price does  not reflect the
company's  value as  an independent  entity  (eg., because of the existence of significant  nonpublic
information),  Schwartz  would  presumably  advocate  that a bank  base  its fairness  opinion on the
company's value as an independent entity.
27.  See, e,  Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating  Competing Tender Offer%  95  HARv.  L. REv.
1028,  103841  (1982);  Gilson,  A Structural  Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in  Tender Offers,  33  STAN.  L.  REV.  819,  868-75  (1981)  (arguing for auction  strategy in
response to tender offer).
28.  Cf Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,  306-07 (1939)  (in self-dealing, test of fairness is whether
transaction has earmarks of arm's-length bargain).  This definition of fair price also follows from the
"sole owner standard"  put forward in Bebchuk,  The Sole Owner Standard  for Takeover Policy, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD.  197,  197-98  (1988).DUKE LAW  JOURNAL
shows  shareholders  whether  they  might  be  better  off not  selling  but
rather  returning  to the  bargaining  table  or  waiting  for  another  bid.29
This value also  shows whether managers  adequately  represented  share-
holders in negotiating transaction  terms and in structuring takeover  de-
fenses.  In particular, use of this definition can indicate whether or not a
conflict of interest affected  managers during negotiation.30  Moreover, if
an acquisition creates unique gains that would not arise from acquisition
by  another  party, bargaining  would  arguably  lead  to a  fair division  of
these gains.
This list of definitions  is not meant to be exhaustive;  indeed,  some
may advance  several other definitions of fair price, such as the value of
the company's net assets31 or the value of the company as an independent
entity plus a fraction  of any gains resulting from the acquisition.  More-
over,  one  can  combine  these  definitions  to form  new  definitions:  fair
price,  for example,  can be defined  as the average of several  definitions,
under the argument that each definition  captures one aspect of value.32
The appropriateness of any definition also might depend on the con-
text of the acquisition in question.  If several suitors showed interest in a
company, an auction  price might arguably be more appropriate than the
independent  value of the company;33 if the acquisition  would  produce
29.  Empirical evidence shows  that many unsuccessful  merger negotiations and tender offers  are
followed by successful bids.  Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale  Behind Interfirm Tender Offer,
11 J. FIN. ECON.  183,  188 (1983)  (of 112 unsuccessful tender offer targets, 86 were acquired within 5
years).  This suggests that shareholders can reasonably expect  to realize a value above a company's
independent  value even if they reject an acquisition  proposal.
30.  Courts  and commentators generally  agree that corporate  control  transactions  involve  the
potential for confficts of interest.  See R.  CLARK,  Co.OiATE  LAW  §§ 4.1,  12.2.5,  13.2.1  (1986).
31.  See, eg., E.I. du  Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432  U.S.  46,  54-56  (1977)  (net  asset
value is fair price); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp.  66,  100 (E.D.N.Y.  1969)  (same),
modified, 478 F.2d  1281  (2d Cir.  1973).
32.  If measurement of fair price  according  to each  definition will  result  in  an unbiased  but
inaccurate estimate  of the true fair  price, an appropriately  weighted  average will result in  a more
accurate  estimate.  See generally T. WONNACOTr  & IL WONNACOTT,  INTRODUCTORY  STATISTICS
FOR  BUSINESS  AND  ECONOMICS  129-31,  179-85  (2d  ed.  1977) (Unless multiple estimators  are per-
fectly correlated, the variance of their sum is less than the sum of their variances;  therefore,  some
weighted  averages  of several  unbiased estimators  will  be a more accurate estimator  than  any one
estimator alone.).
Courts  generally  use a weighted  average of different  measures of value  in the  context of ap-
praisal rights.  See, ,,g.,  Piemonte  v. New Boston Garden  Corp.,  377  Mass. 719,  733,  387  N.E.2d
1145,  1153 (1979)  (upholding weighted average of market value, earnings value, and net asset value);
Endicott Johnson Corp.  v. Bade,  37 N.Y.2d  585,  587, 338 N.E.2d  614, 616,  376 N.Y.S.2d  103,  106
(1975)  (to determine fair value,  court should consider net asset value, investment  value, and market
value).  But cf Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d  701,  712  (Del.  1983) (overruling precedents that
used  weighted average to exclusion of other accepted valuation  techniques).
33.  See  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews  & Forbes  Holdings,  Inc., 506  A.2d  173,  182  (Del.  1986)
(when  company's  sale to one of several  bidders  becomes  inevitable,  directors  obliged  to conduct
neutral auction).
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unique gains, the negotiation price might arguably  be more appropriate
than the auction price.  Another factor that investment banks apparently
consider  relevant  is  whether  a bank  renders  a  fairness  opinion  in  a
friendly or a hostile deal.  In the former, the opinion indicates whether a
reasonably  prudent board could accept the offered terms;34 in the latter,
it states whether the bank believes that a better offer can be obtained.3 5
Turning from acquisitions to other transactions, it seems that every
type of transaction might require a different definition of fair price.  Take
freeze-out mergers as an example.  In these mergers, fair price might fo-
cus on the company's  value  as  an  independent  entity,36 as the market
price of the minority shares, 37 or as the price the minority shares would
receive if auctioned off as a block.3 8  In addition, one might add to any of
these measures a fraction of any freeze-out gains39 that might arise, or an
appropriation for the tax expenses  and reinvestment  transaction  costs4°
that minority shareholders  must incur.41
34.  As investment bankers like to stress, a "fair"  price is not the highest price obtainable, but
rather a price within  the range  that a reasonable and  prudent board  would accept.  See Chazen,
Friedman  & Feuerstein, supra note 21,  at  147; Fleischer, A  "Fairness  Letter" is  Just an Opinion,
N.Y. Tunes, June 8,  1986, § 3, at 2, col. 3.
35.  See Weiss, supra note 24, at 256.
36.  See  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit.  8,  § 262(h)  (1983)  (in determining  fair value  for purposes  of
appraisal  rights,  court should  ignore  any  value  arising  from  accomplishment  or expectation  of
merger  and consolidation);  MODEL Bus. CoP. Acr  § 13.01(3)  (1985)  (defining  "fair value"  for
purposes of dissenters'  rights as excluding any "appreciation  or depreciation in anticipation  of the
corporate action  unless exclusion would  be inequitable").
37.  See  Easterbrook  & Fischel,  Corporate Control Transactions, 91  YALE  LJ.  698,  723-31
(1982)  (minority shareholders should receive market value for shares in freeze-out merger); cf DEL.
CODE  ANN.  tit. 8,  § 262(bXl)  (appraisal  remedy  not available in  cases  involving  publicly  traded
stock).
38.  See  Chazen, Friedman  & Feuerstein, supra note  21,  at  160 (price obtainable for  minority
shares as block provides possible measure of fair price).  These  authors believe  that the block price
would be below the market price, since investors  would have to  sell at  a liquidity discount.  If the
same person owned  all the minority  shares, however, he would  have greater incentives and abilities
to monitor the majority shareholders.  In such a case, the majority would presumably be less able to
divert gains from the minority, and the minority stock's  block price  might exceed  the value of the
stock to dispersed investors.
39.  See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair  Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, '88  HARV.  L.
REv. 297,  345  (1974) (fair treatment  requires that gains be shared).
40.  Toms, Compensating Shareholders  Frozen Out  in Two-Step Mergers, 78  COLUM.  L. REv.
548,  577 & n.104 (1978)  (suggesting  modification of traditional intrinsic value standard to compen-
sate for factors  reducing actual value of frozen-out  shareholder  interests).
41.  In other  transactions, different  definitions of fair price can be justified.  For example,  in a
management buyout, fair price might mean:  a company's independent value, the market price of the
shares;  the price obtainable in an auction; the independent value plus a fraction of the gains expected
from the buyout (eg.,  tax savings  from increased  leverage and gains from improved  incentives  to
managers); or the value of the company assuming management made all changes it planned to make
after the buyout (which would include tax  savings from increased  leverage  but might  not include
gains from improved incentives to managers).  Cf.  Lowenstein, ,anagement  Buyouts;  85 COLUM.  L.
REv. 730, 779-84 (1985)  (arguing for an  auction rule in leveraged  buyouts).
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Investment  bankers  are  free  to  choose  from  any  of these  defini-
tions.42  In part III we will suggest a twofold approach to help solve the
definitional problem:  first, courts should clarify which definitions of fair
price they view as legitimate; second, investment banks should state the
definitions  underlying their opinions.  As explained below,  however, the
definitional problem  is not the only source  of bankers'  discretion.  Even
in the absence of this definitional problem, investment banks would still
retain  significant discretion because of the measurement  problem.
B.  The Measurement Problem
Even financial analyses that employ the same definition of fair price
can arrive at widely differing results.43  To measure fair price, however
defined, any analysis must make a variety of simplifications, assumptions,
and estimates.  Since analysts simplify, assume, and estimate in different
ways"  that are all reasonable and justifiable, they often arrive at different
estimates of fair price.45
Assume, for example, that the appropriate definition of fair price is a
company's  independent value.  An analyst must first decide whether he
should estimate this value by the value of the company's net assets,46 the
discounted  value  of the  company's  future  profits,47  a multiple  of past
earnings,48 the discounted value of future dividend payments, 49 the share
42.  Managers  sometimes  select  the definition  of fairness that  investment  banks must  use  in
writing opinions.  See, ag., Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d  556, 563  (Del. Ch.  1977)  (in negotiated
share repurchase, bank asked to estimate cost of  buying equivalent amount of shares through tender
offer);  Longstreth, New ControlsforLewraged  Buyoutm  N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 6,  1983,  § 3,  at 3, col.  2
(bankers sometimes  asked not to consider liquidation value).
43.  Some  courts  have  recognized  the  subjective  nature  of price  estimates.  See  Radol  v.
Thomas, 534 F. Supp.  1302,  1305 (S.D.  Ohio  1982) (price estimates necessarily  imprecise); Kaplan,
380 A.2d at 567 (valuation depends upon numerous subjective judgments); cf Kahn v. United States
Sugar Corp.,  No. 7313,  slip op. at  18 (Del.  Ch. Dec.  10,  1985) (Westlaw,  1985 WL  4449) (expert
valuations  based  on  subjective judgments);  Joseph  v. Shell  Oil  Co., 482  A.2d 335,  341  (Del.  Ch.
1984) (expert  appraisers usually express  different  opinions even if using same data).
44.  For examples of how different  assumptions  can influence  estimates,  see Kahn  No.  7313,
slip  op. at  18; Kaplan, 380 A.2d  at  567 (estimates  depend on  approach  taken by those  rendering
them).
45.  See also Fischel, supra note  12, at 1452 (discounted-cash-flow  technique can "come up with
just about anything"); cf Note, supra note  12,  at  124 (modern  valuation techniques  do not permit
investment bankers to determine fair price with absolute precision).
46.  See, eg., Piemonte  v.  New Boston Garden  Corp.,  377  Mass. 719,  733,  387  N.E.2d  1145,
1153  (1979)  (net asset value factor  in determining  fair value);  Endicott Johnson  Corp. v. Bade,  37
N.Y.2d  585, 587,  338  N.E.2d  614, 616, 376 N.Y.S.2d  103,  106 (1975)  (same).
47.  See,  eg..  B.  MALKIEL,  A  RANDOM  WALK  DOWN  WALL  STREET  115  (4th  ed.  1985)
(describing fundamental analysis); see also Weinberger v.  UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d  701,  712 (Del. 1983).
48.  See, eg.,  Kahn, No. 7313, slip op. at  19 (experts used  multiples of past earnings  to deter-
mine value); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 65.66 (Me.
1979)  (multiple of past  earnings  given  weight  of 40%  in  calculating  fair  value  under appraisal
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price,5°  or some average of these measures.51
Suppose the analyst decides to estimate the company's value by the
discounted value of its future profits.  She must then collect information
on which to base his estimates.  At this stage, the analyst determines the
appropriate information sources, the required amount of information, the
accuracy of any company-supplied  information, and the necessity of in-
dependently verifying that information.
Based  on  this  information,  the  analyst  must  make  assumptions
about  increases  in  company  costs,  revenues,52  and  future  tax  rates. 53
These assumptions, in turn, depend on such unpredictable  variables  as
future  inflation  rates,  new  product  development,  market  competition,
and the general political climate.  Moreover, the analyst might have to
repeat her calculations for each of a company's product lines.
Finally, the analyst must estimate the discount rate for future prof-
its.  Assume  that  the  analyst  decides  to  use  the  capital  asset  pricing
model to determine the discount rate.  Even if she wanted to apply  the
same discount rate in each time period and to each item of revenue and
cost, she would have to determine the risk-free rate, calculate the covari-
ance of cash flows with the company's market portfolio, and estimate the
market risk premium. 4
Assume that the impossible happens and two analysts agree that a
company will have profits of $100,000  in each coming year, but one ana-
lyst determines that the proper discount rate is eight percent a year while
the other believes the proper rate is ten percent a year.  This two percent
difference  in the discount  rates will result in  estimates that  diverge by
twenty-five percent.  The first analyst will estimate the company's value
at $1,250,000,  while the second  analyst will estimate it at $1,000,000 5
Of course, if the analysts  do not  agree on the amount of future  profits,
49.  PL BREALY  & S.  MYERS,  PRINCIPLES  OF CORPORATE FINANCE  45 (2d  ed.  1984).
50.  See, ,g,  Easterbrook  & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,  35 STAN.  L
REv.  1, 13-14 & n.28  (1982)  (liquid markets offer ready price  for shares);  Easterbrook & Fschel,
The Proper Role of a Target's  Mar .gement in Responding to a Tender Offer,  94 HARv.  L.  REv.
1161,  1165-67  (1981)  (under efficient  capital  market  theory,  share  price  represents  true value  of
firm);,  Schwartz, supra note  26, at  165; cf.  DEL.  CODE  ANN.  tit. 8,  § 262(bXl)  (1983)  (appraisal
rights not available for publicly traded stocks).
51.  See, eg.,  Piemonte v. New  Boston Garden Corp.,  377  Mass. 719,  733,  387  N.E.2d  1145,
1153  (1979)  (weighted average);  Endicott Johnson  Corp. v. Bade, 37  N.Y.2d  585,  587,  338 N.E.2d
614, 616, 376 N.Y.S.2d  103,  106 (1975).
52.  See,  eg.  R.  BREALY  & S.  MYERS,  supra note 49, at 85-96.
53.  See,  e&,  Herskowitz  v.  Nutri/System,  Inc.,  857  F.2d  179,  184  (3rd  Cir.  1988)  (fairness
opinion assumed tax laws would  not change),  cert. denied, 109 S.  Ct. 1315  (1989).
54.  R. BREALY  & S. MYERS, supra note 49, at  128-35 (describing how to apply the capital asset
pricing model).
55.  One can  obtain  the present value of such a cash  flow by dividing  the annual flow  by the
difference between  the discount  rate and the absolute rate of growth  of the cash  flow.
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their estimates  might be even further apart.56  For example,  if the  first
analyst thinks profits will grow at an annual rate of four percent, and the
second analyst thinks they will grow at only two percent, their respective
estimates will be $2,500,000 and $1,250,000.  These analyses-both legit-
imate under prevailing standards---would  produce very different  conclu-
sions about whether a price of, say, $2,000,000  is fair.
A different definition of fair price  could complicate the estimation
process even more.  Assume, for example, that fair price is defined as the
result of takeover negotiations conducted bilaterally and at arm's length,
which presumably includes part of the net gains from an acquisition.  As-
sume that an analyst  hired by  the acquiring  corporation  first estimates
the value  of the acquiring company as an independent  entity.  Next, he
estimates  the value of the target company as an independent entity and
the value of both companies together.  From these three figures, the ana-
lyst then calculates the net gains  from the transaction.
Estimating the value of the target company and of both companies
together creates even greater leeway than estimating just the value of the
acquiring  company.  The analyst will ordinarily have less information-
and will thus be forced to make more estimates-about  the target com-
pany than about the company that hired him.  Similarly, the analyst will
often not know how the surviving company will be managed, and even if
he did, determining  the effects  on value  would leave a wide  margin  of
tolerance.
Finally, in deciding how to split the net gains from the acquisition,
the analyst can justify the-use of several estimation methods.  The analyst
might assess how companies in other transactions have split gains;  alter-
natively, he might assume that gains would be divided equally, on a per-
dollar basis,57 on a percentage  of independent  value basis,58  or on some
other basis.
In sum, however fair price is defined, an investment bank might base
its estimate on a variety of justifiable information  sources,  assumptions,
and measurement  techniques.5 9  By relying on different sources of infor-
56.  Statistically  independent estimates of each item would limit  differences  between analysts'
estimates as a whole.  The estimates on each item would tend to balance the estimate as a whole:  an
analyst who makes a relatively high estimate of the profits on product A  might make a relatively low
estimate  of the profits on product B.
There  are, however, two  reasons to  believe  that estimates on  each  item are  not  independent.
First, some analysts might take a generally  positive or negative approach to the developments in the
company's industry or the economy in general.  Second, as part III will show, analysts have incen-
tives to arrive at price estimates that satisfy  the managers that hired them.
57.  See Brudney  & Chirelstein, supra note 39,  at  316.
58.  See id.  at 320-21.
59.  Even if an  analyst  regards  the stock price  as  the fair  price,  he must  decide  whether  to
include or ignore several factors:  a prospective transaction's impact, the timing of disclosure for that
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mation,  making  different  assumptions,  and using  different  techniques,
banks  might  arrive at widely  different  results.  Even if no definitional
problem  existed, investment banks would retain  significant discretion.
II.  THE PROBLEM  OF CONFLICTS  OF  ITEREST
The  existence  of substantial  discretion  would  present  significant
problems to those wishing  to rely on fairness opinions  even if bankers
faced no conflict of interest.  Even  if all bankers sought to render opin-
ions best reflecting their judgment, the presence of discretion would im-
ply that any one opinion might only reflect one banker's opinion and, as
such, differ markedly from opinions that other analysts would reach.  As
this part explains, however, the existence of discretion presents an espe-
dally severe problem because bankers do face significant  conflicts of in-
terest.  Bankers are thus likely to use their discretion to render opinions
that serve the interests of managers.  By managers, we refer to those of-
ficers and directors of corporations who wield the power to select invest-
ment bankers  and  set  their compensation  schemes.60  For example,  if
managers want shareholders to approve a merger, banks will tend to con-
clude that the merger  terms are fair.  On the other hand, if managers
want to adopt defenses to a hostile takeover, banks will tend to conclude
that the proposed takeover terms are unfair.
This Part demonstrates the pervasiveness of such conflicts of interest
by analyzing their sources and by refuting the alleged grounds  for the
independence  of investment  bankers.  The Part first considers  in detail
the causes of conflicts of interest:  the fee structure for compensating in-
vestment banks and the incentives that structure  creates, the banks'  de-
sire to retain and attract  clients,  and  psychological  and  social factors.
Lastly, this Part argues that investment banks' reputational concerns and
internal procedures will not eliminate these conflicts  of interest.
transaction, and the effect of this information on the stock price.  Cf  Fischel, The Appraisal  Remedy
in Corporate  Law, 1983  AM.  B. FOUND. R.  J. 875, 893-94  (describing econometric market model
for  reconstructing  market  price  while  excluding  effects  of  a  prospective  corporate  control
transacion).
60.  Many have expressed  the view that fairness opinions often do nothing more than rubber-
stamp management  decisions.  See, eg.. McGough, Fairnessfor  Hire  FoRBEs,  July 29,  1985, at 52;
Weiss, supra note 24, at 255; Note, supra note  12, at 127-28; Stein, Investment Banking's  Dirty Little
Secret, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3, at 2, col.  3; Longstreth, supra note 42, at 3, cols. 3-4; see also
Fischel, supra note  14, at 1453  (some experts always willing to opine that price significantly  higher
than share price is fair).  Thus, the contribution  of this part lies not in the novelty of its claim that a
conflict-of-interest  problem  exists but rather in its systematic analysis of the factors producing  this
problem.
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A.  The Fee Structure
One  reason  why investment banks have an incentive  to write fair-
ness opinions consistent with managerial desires stems from the fee struc-
ture under which banks are compensated.  An investment bank generally
does more than just write the fairness opinion for a transaction; the same
bank often controls other financial aspects of the transaction.61  For ex-
ample, in a merger, a bank writing a fairness opinion might also  give a
company  general  financial  advice;62  in  a hostile  takeover  defense,  the
bank might arrange  financial  aspects  of a lock-up  option63  or  a poison
pill.
64
Although  banks  often  receive  a fixed  fee  for fairness  opinions,6 5
other fees that investment banks receive are frequently contingent.66  For
example, in many friendly deals, a significant fraction  of the total fee is
payable on the condition that the transaction is consummated,67 and the
size of this contingent fee may depend on the company's sale price.68 In
other instances, fees are contingent on a raider's failure in a proxy chal-
61.  See  Chazen,  supra  note  1, at  1442-43  (typically, fairness opinion  is  only one  of several
services furnished by investment bank); see also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
257 (7th Cir. 1986) (investment bank provided fairness opinion and advice on proxy fight), rvv  481
U.S. 69 (1987),  MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc.,  501 A.2d 1239,  1243-44 (DeL  Ch.
1985)  (investment bank wrote fairness  opinion and  structured hostile tender  defense),  aff'L  506
A.2d  173  (Del.  1986).
62.  See, eg. Kohn v. American  Metal Climax, Inc.,  458 F.2d 255,  267 (3d Cir. 1972) (bank
served  as general  financial  adviser during amalgamation  discussions),  cert denied, 409  U.S.  874
(1972);  Gerstle v. Gambk-Skogmo,*Inc.,  298 F. Supp.  66,  82-83  (E.D.N.Y.  1969) (bank provided
services involving  debt issue prior to merger), modified, 478 F.2d  1281  (2d  Cir. 1973);, Alleghany
Corp. & Investors Diversified Serv. Inc., supra note 9, at 21 (Alleghany's investment bank to receive
fees for financial  advice and fairness opinion).
63.  See  eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,  781 F.2d 264, 270-71  (2d Cir.
1986) (Goldman  Sachs structured lock-up option and declared that it was fair).
64.  See eg., Dynamics Corp., 794  F.2d at 257-58  (Smith  Barney  structured  poison  pill  and
wrote opinion that tender offer was unfair).
65.  See,  eg.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,  457 A.2d  701,  706 (Del.  1983) (Lehman Brothers  re-
ceived S150,000  for fairness opinion).
66.  Investment banks  usually  receive  a single fee  for  all services  involving  one  transaction.
Confidential interview with Shearson  Lehman Hutton personnel  (Nov. 1988).
67.  For example,  in the acquisition  of ABC  by Capital Cities, ABC's bank was  to receive  $2
million if ABC's shareholders approved the deal and $4.5 million if'the deal was finalized.  American
Broadcasting  Companies,  Inc. & Capital  Cities Communications,  Inc.,  Joint  Proxy  Statement  7
(May  10,  1985).
68.  See, eg.,  Radol  v. Thomas,  534  F. Supp.  1302,  1315 n.19 (S.D.  Ohio  1982)  (investment
bank received base fee plus  1% of share price in  excess of $85);  Joseph v. Shell Oil  Co.,  482 A.2d
335,  339  (DeL  Ch.  1984)  (investment  bank  received  fixed  sum  plus  a bonus  dependent  on price
eventually  paid for minority  shares).  See generally Carrington,  Merger Advisers Say the Big Fees
They're Charging  Are  Warranted, Wall St.  J., July  17,  1981,  at 29,  col.  3,  col. 4 (in  friendly deals,
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lenge,69 on the bank's recruitment  of a white  knight,7 0  or on the com-
pany's making the fairness opinion public.71
Fees contingent on a transaction's consummation  create enormous
incentives for investment bankers to help execute deals.72  In such situa-
tions, investment banks face two alternatives:  they can earn contingent
fees if they characterize management proposals as fair, or they can garner
modest fees if deals collapse as a result of their opinions.73
For  instance,  in  the  merger  of  Cleveland  Electric  and  Toledo
Edison, Morgan  Stanley was to receive  $3.794  million if the companies
actually merged,  but only  $350,000  otherwise.74  In the acquisition  of
Allied Stores by Campeau,  Goldman Sachs was to receive a straight fee
of $1 million and an additional  fee in the amount  of one-third  of one
percent  (estimated to be $13  million)  of the total price paid for Allied
shares, minus the $1 million straight fee.75
Another example is the involvement of Smith Barney in Dynamics'
hostile tender offer and proxy contest for CTS.  CTS retained the bank to
write a fairness  opinion  on the tender offer and to give other financial
advice.76  If Dynamics, the hostile  raider, lost the proxy contest,  Smith
Barney would receive a bonus of $75,000.77 Thus, Smith Barney had an
incentive to find the tender offer unfair.  If Smith Barney had found the
tender offer fair, Dynamics would have been more likely to win the con-
test and the bank would have lost its bonus.  Similarly, if a bank's fees are
contingent on the appearance of a white knight the bank has incentives
to find the original raider's offer unfair; if fees are contingent on the opin-
69.  See,  eg., Dynamics Corp. of Am.  v.  CTS  Corp.,  794  F.2d 250,  257 (7th  Cir.  1986)  (in
hostile tender offer,  investment bank hired to determine fairness received bonus if hostile suitor lost
proxy fight), rev'd, 481  U.S.  69  (1987).
70.  See,  eg, RadoA  534 F. Supp. at 1315 (bank's fee contingent upon success of white knight's
tender offer).
71.  See,  eg.,  Herskowitz  v. Nutri/System, Inc.,  857  F.2d  179,  18313d  Cir.  1988)  (bank re-
ceived S75,000 if opinion published and $50,000 if not), cert  denied,  109 S. Ct. 1315  (1989); Ander-
son v. Boothe, 103 F.RLD. 430, 435 (D. Minn. 1984) (bank received fixed fee of $250,000 for opinion
and additional  $150,000  if opinion liade publicly available).
72.  See Anderson,  103 F.R.D. at 436 (contingent  fees could bias fairness opinion);  Note, supra
note  12, at  128 (contingent fees create  conflict of interest).
73.  To be sure, an investment bank's judgment  that a price  is unfair does not necessarily  de-
stroy a deal; nor does an opinion that the proposed terms are fair ensure a transaction's  consumma-
tion.  As long as  a  favorable  opinion  increases  the  chances  of a  deal's  consummation,  though,
investment banks  will face the incentives  we describe.
74.  Centerior  Energy Corp.,  Cleveland  Elec.  llum'n Co.  & Toledo Edison  Co., Joint  Proxy
Statement  12 (Oct. 4,  1985).
75.  Allied Stores Corp.,  Information  Statement 9 (Dec.  9,  1986).
76.  Dynamics Corp. ofAm. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,257 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd,  481 U.S.  69
(1987).
77.  Id
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ion's  publication,  a bank  will  have  an  incentive  to  render an  opinion
favorable  to management interests.
Since banks are compensated  primarily for services other than writ-
ing  fairness  opinions,  they  have  incentives  to  render  pro-management
opinions  even in  situations  involving  noncontingent  fees,  because  such
opinions  will typically  generate more work than opposition  opinions.78
For example, a merger-killing  negative opinion will destroy all the busi-
ness that a merger  would have created for a bank.  Thus, even under a
noncontingent  fee  scheme,  banks'  pro-management  opinions  create
higher revenues  (and profits).  The difference in incentives between  con-
tingent and noncontingent fees is therefore only a matter of degree:  in-
vestment banks  compensated  on the basis of work performed  will face
smaller  (but still positive) incentives  to generate pro-management  opin-
ions than will banks  compensated  on a contingent basis.79
Some investment bankers and commentators  argue that contingent
fees operate in a different way:  under a compensation scheme that makes
fees a percentage  of the final deal price, banks maximize fees by seeking
high prices.8 0  Thus, the scheme  provides banks with incentives  to find
deals unfair in order to induce higher sales prices.  However, only contin-
gent  fees  that depend  on  final  sales  prices ("percentage  fees")  provide
such countervailing incentives to a seller's investment bank, and fees are
often contingent on other factors."'  For example, they can be contingent
on a deal's execution but not be derived from the price payable to share-
holders.8 2  Such contingent fees create no countervailing incentives, and
purchase prices under such a scheme are not likely to increase.
78.  Management  might desire an  opinion that a particular  merger proposal  or tender offer is
unfair in order to justify  defensive tactics.  In some cases, the fees that banks can  earn in the pre-
vented  corporate  control transactions  might be larger  than the fees from structuring the defenses.
Even in such cases, though, investment banks will have an incentive to render the opinion desired by
management.  If the bank were to issue an opinion favoring  the transaction,  management would in
all likelihood not retain the writing bank for the control transaction,  and the bank would not profit
from larger fees.  If the bank writes the opinion desired by management, it will at least earn the small
fees for structuring the defenses.
79.  Incentives to write pro-management  opinions under a contingent  fee system will be larger
than those generated under a noncontingent fee system only if an investment bank has worked on a
deal prior to writing the fairness opinion at issue.  In such a case, the fairness opinion will affect both
the expected profits from any work to be done in the future and the compensation for work already
completed.  If,  however, the bank has rendered no other services before writing the fairness opinion,
incentives  under  both  compensation  systems  should be  equal.  Under  either system,  the fairness
opinion will affect  expected  profits from work to be done in  the future, and  there  is no reason  to
assume that these expected  profits are larger if the bank is compensated  on a contingency basis.
80.  See  e.g.,  Fleischer, supra note  34, at 2, col.  4 (contingent fees act as incentive for  invest-
ment banks  to obtain highest possible price).
81.  See supra notes 75-77  and accompanying  text.
82.  See, eg.,  Beatrice  Cos.,  Proxy  Statement  12 (Mar.  11,  1986)  (fee  of $15  million payable
immediately  when merger consummated;  otherwise  payable in installments).
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Moreover, even with respect to percentage fees, a bank that rejects a
proposed price as unfair must consider the possibility that such a rejec-
tion  will jeopardize the entire deal.8 3  An attempt to push  up the price
will pay only if the likelihood  of killing the deal is relatively small.  As-
sume, for example, that an investment bank stands to receive 0.1% of the
purchase price on consummation of a deal.  A bank would benefit from
trying to raise the price from  $100  million to $110  million only if the
probability of killing the deal were less than approximately  10%.  Thus,
even with percentage  fees,  banks often  would  not attempt  to increase
purchase prices.
In summary, both contingent and noncontingent fee structures cre-
ate incentives  for investment banks to write opinions  aligned with man-
agement  interests.  Under  contingent  fee  structures,  pro-management
opinions increase the likelihood that the specified contingencies  will take
place;  under  noncontingent  fee  schemes,  such  opinions  increase  the
amount of work available to the writing, bank.  In both cases, pro-man-
agement opinions  increase investment banks' revenues.
B.  The Desire to Attract and Retain Clients
Assume, as  before, that an  investment bank  receives  0.1%  of the
purchase price if a potential sale is consummated.  Assume further that
the bank perceives only a 5%  chance that increasing the price from $100
million to, $110  million  will kill the transaction.  A bank attempting to
maximize its fees should try to increase the purchase price, because the
expected fee from the sale would increase from $100,000  to $104,500.
In each  transaction,  however,  an investment  bank  must consider
both the possible fees from this particular transaction and the impact of
that transaction on future business.  Investment banks have an incentive
to write opinions that attract future clients.  The ultimate question, then,
remains:  what do clients want from investment banks when they retain
them to write fairness opinions?  Investment banks that deliver what cli-
ents want will attract futuW business; investment banks that do not, will
not.
Although  formally  an  investment  bank's  clients  are  corporations
themselves, it is certain officers and directors-referred  to here as manag-
ers-who select investment banks.  Since managers decide which invest-
ment banks to hire, banks will  attract business by satisfying managers.
Because  managers  are  likely  to be well informed  about an  investment
83.  Note that fees of investment banks representing buyers are sometimes a percentage of the
sales price.  See  egg,  Carrington, supra note 68, at 29, col. 4 (First Boston, representing du Pont in
its bid for Conoco, received 0.2% of sales price as fee).  Apparently, in these instances, buyers do not
believe that such fees create  strong incentives  for investment banks  to increase sales  prices.
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bank's reputation and its approach  to fairness opinions, the bank's  per-
formance  affects  its future employment  prospects  with  both its present
client and other potential clients.  In particular, one would imagine that
word would quickly spread if an investment bank killed a deal by trying
to increase the purchase price of a corporation.  Furthermore, major law
firms retained by managers provide information  about the reputation of,
most investment  banks.  Thus,  incentives  created  by investment  banks'
desire to be hired for future transactions are potentially much stronger
than incentives  created by fee structures in an individual transaction.
Because  investment banks  have strong incentives  to satisfy  manag-
ers, fairness opinions  are  unlikely to  serve  as an  effective  independent
check  on managerial  activity.  To the contrary, the desire to retain and
attract  clients will lead investment  banks to write the fairness opinions
that managers  wish to see.  Banks  that adapt their fairness  opinions  to
the wishes of managers will tend to be rehired, whereas banks that write
contrary opinions  are less likely to be retained.
C.  Psychological  and Social Factors
The psychological  and social loyalty that investment bankers some-
times feel toward managers reinforces the economic incentives created by
the fee structure and by the desire to retain and attract clients.  Because
many  investment  bankers  personally  know  the  managers  who  hired
them,8  bankers  tend  to  feel  more  sympathetic  to  managers  than  to
shareholders  and tend to place greater weight  on managerial  goals and
views.  As a result, fairness  opinions often favor managerial interests.85
Even in the absence.of personal relations between bankers and man-
agers, though, many transactions create an atmosphere of common pur-
pose that tends  to reduce  bankers'  objectivity.86  For instance,  a bank
evaluating  a  transaction  may  have  assisted  managers  in  creating  and
structuring that transaction. 7  Or, a bank retained  to  defend  against a
hostile takeover might help to search for a white knight.8  In such in-
84.  See.  eg.,  Weinberger v. UOP,  Inc., 457 A.2d  701,  706  (Del.  1983)  (fairness  opinion  pre-
pared  by investment banker who was also a longtime director of UOP).
85.  Cf Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,  298 F. Supp.  66, 95  (E.D.N.Y.  1969) (prior business
relation raises doubts about investment bank's impartiality), modified, 478 F.2d 1281  (2d Cir. 1973).
86.  See. eg.,  MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc.,  501  A.2d  1239,  1243  (Del.  Ch.
1985)  (investment  bank and  management together developed  defensive  share repurchase  plan and
poison  pill), aff'd, 506  A,2d  173 (Del.  1986).
87.  See  eg.,  Gersdte  298  F.  Supp.  at  95  (structuring  merger  and  evaluating  its  fairness
"blurred"  investment bank's "lenses,"  resulting  in failure to note erroneous property valuation).
88.  See, e-g.,  Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,  781  F.2d 264, 268-69,  271  (2d
Cir.  1986)  (investment  banker involved  both in  preparation  of fairness  opinion and  in search  for
white  knight).
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stances, bankers and managers share a team spirit,8 9 even a siege mental-
ity.  In  addition,  banks  and  corporations  often  establish  continuing
relationships that add to this collaborative atmosphere.90  These relation-
ships may lead bankers  to give undue weight to managers'  goals, at the
cost of shareholder interests.
D.  Objections to the Analysis
This section discusses and rejects the commonly given reasons why
bankers are likely to write fairness opinions that reflect their best, unbi-
ased judgments.  In particular, the section argues:  first, that a concern
for professional reputation does not lead investment banks to render un-
biased fairness opinions, and second, that internal procedures and guide-
lines fail to eliminate the conflicts of interest facing investment banks.
1.  Pmfessional  Reputation.  One familiar argument holds that in-
vestment  banks' desire to maintain a professional  reputation  may lead
them to provide  unbiased  fairness opinions.  A professional  reputation
for quality work is an important asset to an investment bank, so the argu-
ment goes, and banks might well be reluctant to jeopardize such a repu-
tation  by  writing  biased  opinions.  Managers  use  these  opinions  to
convince  courts  that fiduciary  duties  have  been  met  and  to persuade
shareholders  to approve transactions. 91  Since  courts and  shareholders
would place less weight on fairness opinions known to be biased, banks
have a clear interest in upholding their reputation for unbiased opinions.
Courts, however, have not indicated that they pay close attention to
the  trustworthiness  of fairness  opinions  written  by  specific  banks.92
Rather, courts fail to differentiate  among  investment banks as  long as
89.  See,  &, MacAndrema & Forbes, 501  A.2d  at 1243  (investment bankers,  managers,  and
la~'yers together developed program to protect company against tender offer).
90.  For example,  Merrill Lyncyrepresented  Alleghany in its merger with Investors Diversified
Services  (lI)S) in  1979.  Prior to that Merrill  Lynch had  represented Alleghany in its 1975 merger
with MIS; in a 1977 tender offer for IDS stock, twice in 1977 with respect to IDS Realty Trust; and
again in  1978 with respect to the trust.  In total, Merrill Lynch earned revenues of over $500,000 in
these transactions.  Similarly, in the three years prior to the Alleghany merger, Salomon Brothers,
which  represented  IDS,  had  earned about $4.5 million from  earlier representation  of IDS.  Alle-
ghany Corp. & Investors Diversified  Servs. Inc., supra note 9, at 27-28.
91.  See supra notes  11-15 and accompanying  text.
92.  In the acquisition of Stokely-Van  Camp,  Dillon  Read, an  investment  bank, advised  the
directors that the proposed price of $55 in a management buyout was fair.  Quaker Oats eventually
acquired Stokely for $77 per share and Quaker Oats apparently made significant profits in the deal.
McGough, supra note 60, at 52.  Nonetheless, courts have not discounted  fairness opinions issued by
Dillon  Read.  See, eg.,  Cottle  v. Storer Communication, Inc.,  849 F.2d  570,  578  (1  1th Cir.  1988)
(fairness  opinion by Dillon Read  given weight).
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those banks have sufficient credentials. 93  Furthermore, to the extent that
courts do pay attention to professional reputation, they are likely to eval-
uate fairness  opinions on the basis of a bank's general  reputation rather
than  on the basis  of its  reputation with  respect to  fairness  opinions.94
Shareholders, while they might pay more attention to the general reputa-
tion  of investment  banks,  are  likely  to  have  less  specific  information
about investment banks than managers have.  Shareholders are, at most,
aware of the general reputation of investment  banks,95 and  this  knowl-
edge alone should  not preclude  managers from  selecting  an investment
bank that is willing to write a pro-management  opinion.96  Thus, invest-
ment  banks  that  enjoy  a  broad  reputation  for  providing  high-quality
work  will  still  have  incentives  to  write  pro-management  fairness
opinions.
To  maintain  credibility  with  courts  and  shareholders,  investment
banks need only avoid writing fairness opinions that they cannot reason-
ably justify. That is, investment banks must not opine that utterly unrea-
sonable  prices  are  fair  or that clearly  fair  prices  are  inadequate.  If a
particular bank's  opinions  were  repeatedly  outside this  range  of legiti-
mate fair prices,  its reputation  would  decline so noticeably  that courts
and shareholders would give less weight to its opinions.  As part I points
out, however, such a reasonableness requirement imposes only a limited
constraint on choices available to investment banks; banks may still write
pro-management  opinions  as long as  their opinions  remain within  this
range of legitimate fair prices.
2.  Internal Procedures and Guidelines.  One  might  also  argue
that  internal  procedures  and  guidelines  ensure  that investment  banks
write unbiased opinions.  A bank will issue fairness opinions only accord-
ing  to these procedures  and guidelines.  For example, some  investment
93.  Cf Kahn  v. United  States Sugar Corp.,  No. 7313, slip op. at 29 (Del.  Ch. Dec.  10,  1985)
(Westlaw, 1985  WL 4449) (noting "impressive credentials" of experts that valued same company at
$52  and $122  per share, respectively).
94.  See  eg., Denison  Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp.,  388  F. Supp.  812,  821  (D. Del.  1974)
(noting reputation of Lehman Brothers  in investment  banking field).
95.  Cf.  id. (finding  it difficult to overestimate  impact to shareholders  of reference  to Lehman
Brothers).
96.  One might wonder why courts and shareholders  do not pay closer attention  to the reputa-
tion of investment  banks.  One reason why courts do not scrutinize reputation might be that legally
admissible evidence will not provide a reliable picture of reputation.  Another possible reason is that
all  reputable  investment  banks  give  pro-management  fairness opinions.  Thus,  a court  could  not
denounce a particular bank's behavior as different from the norm; all that courts could possibly do is
to criticize the behavior of the whole investment banking industry.  Shareholders, of course, lack the
incentives to acquire information  about  the reputation of investment banks,  because most of them
own  only  a small  fraction  of a  company's  shares  and  because  their  vote is  unlikely  to make  a
difference.
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banks have established internal committees that monitor the issuance of
fairness opinions.
97
A primary reason  for establishing  these procedures  or guidelines,
however, is to ensure that individual bankers  act in the interest  of the
investment bank as a whole.98  If it is in the interest of the bank itself to
write pro-management  opinions,  procedures  and  guidelines  will  direct
employees  to  do  the  same.  Internal  procedures  and  guidelines  thus
should tend to produce fairness opinions that increase  fees and help to
retain and attract cients.99
To be sure, guidelines and procedures have some beneficial effect on
the quality of fairness opinions.  In order to maintain a professional repu-
tation, banks are likely to write guidelines and procedures ensuring that
all fairness  opinions  have  a reasonable  basis.' °°  Furthermore, internal
procedures and guidelines might try to limit the psychological and social
factors which  lead individual bankers to issue an opinion that is more
pro-management than is in the bank's interest.  However, the incentives
to render pro-management opinions that are created by the fee structure
and the desire to retain and attract clients affect the interest of the bank
itself, rather than only the interests of individual bankers.  Therefore, in-
ternal procedures and guidelines  should be expected  to  solidify, rather
than reduce, the force of these pro-management  incentives.
97.  Shearson Lehman Hutton has a committee  that monitors all fairness opinions before they
are issued.  Confidential  interview, supra note  66.
98.  Another  reason, presumably,  is to avoid legal liability  arising from fairness opinions.  In
that case, the procedures and guidelines can be expected to reach as far as potential legal liability.
But to establish liability shareholders must establish that the investment banker knowingly misrepre-
sented the contents of a fairness opinion.  See Note, supra note  12, at 128-30 (reviewing  the stan-
dards for investment  banker liability under both  federal and  state law).  Even under a negligence
rule, investment bankers would not be liable for a fairness opinion that could be reasonably justified.
99.  The various formulations iud in fairness opinions might illustrate how guidelines can pro-
duce pro-management  opinions.  In  mergers,  fairness  opinions  conventionally  state  whether  the
terms  are fair, Le.,  within  a range  of values  a reasonable prudent board would  accept.  In hostile
tender offers, fairness opinions state whether the terms are adequate, i.e., whether better terms could
be obtained.  See Weiss, supra note 24, at 256.  Since terms must generally be higher to be adequate
than to be fair, terms that are fair in mergers (which the managers generally  like to approve) are
inadequate in hostile tender offers (which the managers generally do not like to approve).  The lack
of specific  guidelines can also  serve these purposes.  Shearson Lehman Hutton, for example, has no
written  guidelines and no fixed  standards for issuing fairness opinions.  Rather, each  case is evalu-
ated individually.  Confidential interview, supra note 66.  Such an ad hoc approach  would enable a
bank,  if it  so  desired,  to  conform  the  content  of the  fairness  opinion  to  the  wishes  of the
management.
100.  For instance,  Shearson  Lehman  Hutton considers  various measures  of fairness before  it
issues a fairness opinion.  Confidential interview, supra note  66.DUKE LAW JOURNAL
III.  A RECOMMENDED  JUDICIAL  APPROACH
This part suggests a judicial approach for dealing with the problems
analyzed  above.  By following this approach,  courts can reduce both the
discretion that investment banks currently  possess  and the conflicts  of
interest that they face.  Sections A, B, and C explain,  respectively,  how
courts  should scrutinize  the  definition  of fairness,  the measurement  of
fair price, and the banker-company relationship.  Finally, Section D sug-
gests that, even with such scrutiny, courts should still exercise substantial
residual caution in dealing with fairness opinions.
A.  Scrutinizing the Definition of  Fair  Price
The two most natural ways to attack the mutiple-definition problem
are:  first, for courts to clarify the definitions of fairness that banks should
use while preparing opinions, and second, for banks to disclose the defini-
tion underlying  each  opinion.  Courts should  recognize  the conceptual
confusion that surrounds the definition of fairness and try to build a sys-
tem of definitions through precedent.  These precedents  will,  over time,
establish definitions appropriate to each  context.  Although these prece-
dents alone may not eliminate all uncertainty about the proper definition
of fairness, it is likely to reduce the range of definitions that are arguably
proper in any one transaction.
In particular, courts should examine the different standards that in-
vestment  banks  use  to  evaluate  friendly  deals  and  hostile  deals.  In
friendly transactions, banks couch opinions in terms of fairness (Would a
rational board accept the offer?), whereas in hostile deals banks evaluate
offers in terms of adequacy (Can a higher offer be obtained?). 01  Unless
courts conclude that these different standards are warranted, they should
not give weight to fairness opinions  written in this fashion. 1°2
At the same time, courts should require that  investment banks ex-
plicitly state the definitions of fairness  used in preparing their opinions.
Banks should be free to use several definitions  if they  so  desire;  in that
case,  however,  banks should  state  under  which  definitions  the price  is
fair, and under  which  definitions  the  price  is  unfair.  For  example,  an
opinion should not state that a price is fair from a financial point of view;
rather, it should  state that the price is fair compared to the pre-merger-
announcement  stock  price  or fair  compared  to  the  price the  company
101.  See  Weiss, supra note 24,  at 256.
102.  See id. (in take-out mergers,  fairness opinions should  be framed  in terms of adequacy,  not
fairness).
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would carry in an auction.1 03
The  inclusion  of explicit  definitions  of fairness  will  assist judicial
analysis of fairness opinions.  The  respect  accorded  any given  fairness
opinion should depend on whether the definitions used in the opinion's
preparation conform to the appropriate contextual  definitions.  Thus, if
courts have established  a proper definition,  investment banks will know
exactly how to prepare opinions that the courts will respect.  But even if
such a definition  is not judicially  established when a fairness  opinion is
written, courts  will be able to judge the extent to which  the definition
used  deviates  from  the  proper  definition  and  then  decide  how  much
weight to give the fairness opinion.
This approach is not overly demanding.  It neither requires that fair-
ness opinions use the judicially  established definitions nor requires that
companies obtain fairness opinions.  If, however, a company does obtain
a fairness  opinion,  the opinion should  explicitly state the definitions it
uses.  And, as courts determine which definitions are proper, they should
indicate them to enable companies to obtain opinions based on those defi-
nitions, and  courts  should give weight  only to  opinions that use  such
definitions.
B.  Scrutinizing the Measurement of Fair  Price
The problem of evaluating bankers'  measurement  processes is more
difficult to  solve.  Price estimates  are inherently  imprecise.  Courts  are
unable (and should not attempt) to specify in advance what assumptions
bankers should make and what valuation techniques they should use. 1°4
Rather, courts should weigh an opinion depending  on whether it states a
range of fair prices °5 and on the extent to which its conclusion is sensi-
tive to its assumptions.  Thereby,  fairness opinions will  convey  more in-
formation and investment banks will have less discretion.
103.  One might wonder why investment bankers have not themselves clarified the definitions of
fair price.  One reason  why the confusion  has remained  might be, as we suggested  in part II, that
managers benefit from it:  the less defined  the concept  of fair price, the higher the discretion to the
investment bankers, and the greater their opportunity to arrive at a satisfactory opinion.
104.  Cf Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,  713 (Del.  1983)  (all generally  accepted valua-
tion techniques may be used to estimate fair value  for purposes of appraisal  rights).  Note that the
standard  for fairness opinions should be based on valuation techniques used in estimating prices for
purposes other than fairness  opinions.  If the standards  were based  on  techniques used solely  for
fairness opinions, the investment banking industry would tend to develop standards that would make
it easy to render pro-management  opinions.
105.  Investment banks are often reluctant to specify numbers for fair prices.  Chazen, Friedman
& Feuerstein, supra note 21,  at 146.  However,  in some cases,  they  are apparently willing  to  give
ranges of fair prices.  See,  eg.  Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. 7313, slip op. at 30 (Del.  Ch.
Dec.  10,  1985) (Westlaw,  1985 WL 4449) (Bear Stearns gives price range of $62  to $68  per share).
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In concluding that a price  is fair without giving a range of prices,
banks can base opinions on barely reasonable assumptions.  For example,
if reasonable fair stock prices for a company involved  in a merger range
from $50 to $90 per share, a bank will have no difficulty in justifying an
opinion that a merger price of $55  is fair.  If banks are forced to give a
range of fair prices, however, it will become harder for them to make bad
deals look good.  Because assumptions become more difficult to justify as
they become  more extreme, banks will be unable to come up with arbi-
trary price ranges.  For instance, a bank might arrive at $50  to $70 as a
fair price range, with the merger price of $55  close to the bottom of this
range.  With  a  lower price  range, however  (say,  $45  to  $65),  the bank
might open itself to attack with  respect to the (fairly unreasonable)  as-
sumptions that resulted in a $45 estimate.  In such an example, directors
would incur the risk of censure for accepting a blatantly  biased fairness
opinion, and banks would incur the risk of gaining a reputation for ren-
dering unreasonable  opinions.
Analyzing  the sensitivity  of price  estimates  to assumptions  serves
the same purpose as requiring  specification of fair-price ranges.  In per-
forming sensitivity analyses,  analysts construct a base scenario and then
show how the outcome of that scenario varies with changes in assump-
tions.106  In  showing  how  estimates  change  as  assumptions  vary,  this
analysis indicates the type of assumptions one must make for a seemingly
fair  price to  become  unfair.  A sensitivity  analysis,  like specification  of
price ranges, will tend to show how fair or unfair a price is, not merely
whether the price is fair or not.
In  giving  weight  to  fairness  opinions,  courts  should  consider
whether a corporation's  directors  have been told  a range  of fair prices
and the results of a sensitivity analysis.  Take a hostile tender offer as an
example:  if directors  approve  a defensive  measure,  a  fairness  opinion
should receive greater weight if the directors were informed that the hos-
tile bid was significantly below the range of fair prices and would remain
below such a range even if certain (specified) assumptions were modified,
and less  weight if directors were  merely  told that  the price  was inade-
quate, was in the middle of the range of fair prices, or was unfair under
some  "reasonable"  assumptions  but  fair  under  other  "reasonable"
assumptions.
Finally,  in certain  sufficiently  unusual situations,  courts  should be
willing even to engage  in an independent review of the reasonableness  of
the assumptions and techniques 0 7 used to prepare fairness opinions and,
106.  See generally R. BREALY  & S.  MYERS,  supra note 49, at  195-202.
107.  See, e.g.,  Kahn, No. 7313, slip  op. at  29-33 (court examined  assumptions on which  valua-
tions were  based).
[Vol.  1989:27FAIRNESS OPINIONS
in  turn, the reasonableness  of directors'  reliance  on those  opinions. 10 °8
Such scrutiny, of course,  requires that banks disclose their assumptions
and techniques to directors and to courtsY°9
However,  even  if all these steps  are  taken,  investment banks  will
retain a significant amount of discretion.  Bankers  can reasonably  differ
on the upper and lower limits  of fair  price ranges  and on methods  of
performing sensitivity analyses.  And courts must allow directors to rely
on a variety of reasonable assumptions  and techniques.  Thus, our  ap-
proach will only constrain-but not eliminate--investment banks' ability
to manipulate fair-price measurements.
C.  Scrutinizing  the Banker-Company Relationship
As discussed,110  the nature of the relationship between investment
banks and corporations creates conflicts of interest that tend to produce a
pro-management  bias  in fairness  opinions.  Courts  should  reduce  this
bias by scrutinizing the banker-corporation  relationship.  As a first step,
courts should discount fairness opinions for which any part of the bank's
fee  is  contingent.  Fees  contingent  on  results  other than  the eventual
purchase price are especially suspect because they give banks no counter-
vailing incentives  to increase the purchase price.  Although some courts
have realized that investment banks in such situations hardly function as
independent  and  objective  advisors," 1  most courts have  not  expressed
such concerns about contingent fee arrangements.11 2
One might respond that contingent fees create efficiencies that make
their use desirable.  In particular, contingent  fees  may  give investment
banks performance incentives.  For example, fees contingent  on the price
shareholders  receive for their shares will give banks an incentive to in-
crease the purchase price.  Fees that are contingent on winning a proxy
contest or on procuring a white knight will provide incentives to assist in
the proxy contest or to look for a white knight.
108.  See. e.g,  Hanson  Trust PLC v. MIL  SCM Acquisition,  Inc.,  781  F.2d 264, 275  (2d Cir.
1986)  (directors obligated to become reasonably familiar with investment  banker's report); see also
Note, supra note  12,  at 134 (directors should be able to rely only on fairness opinions that conform
to accepted  standards in  investment banking  industry).
109.  Proxy statements  do not generally  include calculations  made in arriving  at their fairness
opinion.  Cf  Chazen,  Friedman  & Feuerstein, supra  note  21,  at  151  (calculations  usually  not
helpful).
110.  See supra notes  60-99  and accompanying text.
111.  See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTs Corp.,  794 F.2d 250, 257  (7th Cir.  1986) (Posner, J.)
(critical comment  on incentives  created  by contingent  fee), rev'd, 481  U.S. 69  (1987).
112.  Many opinions fail to mention that the investment  bank involved received a contingent  fee.
See  eg., Cottle  v. Storer Communication,  Inc.,  849 F.2d  570,  578 (11th  Cir.  1988).
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We  do not suggest,  however, that investment banks  should be pro-
hibited from negotiating and executing any type of fee arrangement,  in-
cluding  contingent  fees.113  Rather, we  only point  out that courts must
recognize  the inevitable  conflicts  of interest that contingent  fees  create
and should accordingly  discount fairness opinions written under contin-
gent  fee arrangements.
Note that the beneficial incentives created by contingent  fees do not
relate to fairness opinions themselves; rather, the incentives operate with
respect  to  other  services  provided  by  investment  banks.  If managers
want  both unbiased fairness  opinions and  contingent  fee arrangements,
they can hire a second investment bank solely to write a fairness opinion.
By doing so, they maintain incentives for the bank in charge of the bulk
of a transaction without creating a conflict  of interest for the bank writ-
ing the fairness opinion.  Managers,  though, remain  free to obtain  fair-
ness opinions  from banks compensated under contingent  fees  (opinions
to which  courts  will give less  weight) or, for that matter, to  obtain  no
fairness opinions  whatsoever.
Hiring  a second  investment  bank-preferably  one  that  is  not  in-
volved in other aspects of the transaction and has no longstanding rela-
tionship  with  the  corporation-is  preferable  to  eliminating  the
contingent  fee for other reasons  as well.  As we have shown, even  non-
contingent  fees  create  incentives  to  render  pro-management  fairness
opinions;  these pro-management  opinions usually help to create follow-
up  work for the  writing bank.  If, however,  a bank  writing a  fairness
opinion is not involved with other aspects of the transaction, such a bank
will not be influenced  by the possibility that a particular fairness opinion
might  create  more work.  Furthermore,  hiring  an  "outside"  bank  will
reduce the psychological and social factors that tend to create pro-man-
agement  fairness  opinions.  A second  investment  bank will  be  at a dis-
tance from the transaction  and thus more likely to write a more neutral
opinion.
Retaining a second investment bank just to write a fairness opinion
will of course create some costs.  This second bank will have to duplicate
some of the lead bank's work.  Lacking familiarity with the company, an
"outside"  bank  will need to do more work to determine fair prices  than
would an investment bank  that already knows  the company.  A second
bank might also be hard to find.  By writing a fairness opinion for a fairly
small fee, such a bank disqualifies itself from representing other potential
113.  One might draw an analogy, though, to the position of public accountants,  which  is similar
to that of investment bankers.  Managers hire accountants  in  order to certify books prepared  under
management  supervision.  Accountants,  however,  may  not  be  compensated  by  contingent  fees.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics  § 302, Rule 302.01  (Am. Inst. of Certified  Pub. Accountants  1988).
[Vol.  1989:27/FAIRNESS OPINIONS
bidders  for the company and  earning a significantly  larger fee.  Lastly,
although the second investment bank earns only a relatively small fee, it
stands to bear all the possible liability. 114
One should not, however, exaggerate the extent of these costs.  The
cost of issuing a fairness opinion is often trivial in relation to the amounts
involved in a transaction as a whole."15  The concern about disqualifica-
tion would seem to apply only in the context of hostile takeovers; a bank
asked to evaluate the fairness of a merger or a freeze-out  price  would
have  little  hope  of being  hired by a newly  emerging  bidder.  Further-
more, market  forces  can respond  to concerns  about  disqualification;  if
these concerns really matter, some specialized investment banks that do
nothing but write fairness opinions (and thus do not have to worry about
disqualification)  will  emerge.  Lastly,  investment  banks  can  insure
against  legal liability and, in  any case, the threat of legal liability  will
have positive effects as investment banks exercise more care and neutral-
ity in rendering fairness opinions.' 6
D.  Residual Skepticism
Even if courts follow  the above approach, we feel that they should
still use substantial  caution  in relying on fairness  opinions.  While  our
approach  addresses some of the problems inherent in fairness  opinions,
significant residual problems remain.  First, although our approach does
much to reduce the discretion rooted in the definition of fairness, invest-
ment  banks would  retain  significant  discretion in measuring  fair price.
Estimating the value of uncertain future income streams, assets that are
not openly traded  in the market, or prices that companies would  com-
mand in an  auction that  is never  held  is an inherently  subjective  and
imprecise  activity.  Specifying  price  ranges  and  performing  sensitivity
analyses would reduce these subjective elements, but even these remedies
would not magically transform fairness opinions into objective yardsticks
of a company's value.
Second,  our approach  does not completely  eliminate  all incentives
for banks to write pro-management  fairness opinions.  The scrutiny we
propose would reduce the conflicts of interest inherent in the fee  struc-
ture, but would not reduce the incentives created by the desire to retain
and attract  clients.  Even uninvolved  "outside"  banks  would  still have
114.  See  Note, supra note  12,  at  135-39 (discussing investment  banker's potential  liability).
115.  See  e,  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A-2d 701,  704-06 (Del.  1983) (bank given S150,000
for fairness opinion in cash tender offer of over S90,000,000, which involved a premium  over market
price of more than $30,000,000).
116.  Cf Note, supra note  12,  at  135 (advocating increased  liability of investment  banks).
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incentives to  deliver opinions that retain and attract clients. t1 7
Third,  even  if these  reputational  incentives  to render pro-manage-
ment  opinions were  absent,  the simple fact that  managers select  invest-
ment banks leads to biased opinions.  Investment banking firms are likely
to differ in how they measure fair prices and in whether their estimates
tend to come out high or low.  For example, it might become known that
a particular bank tends to rely on adjusted share prices to determine fair
prices.  Managers could select that bank if such a method of determining
price were likely to result in the desired fairness opinion.
Fourth,  courts would  have to remain  aware that fairness  opinions
are,  in  part,  necessarily  based  on  information  provided  by  managers
themselves,  such  as  managerial  opinions  about  future  business  pros-
pects'"8  or internal profit forecasts.'1 9  Managers have an obvious incen-
tive  to  provide  banks  with  the  kind  of  information  that  tends  to
encourage pro-management  opinions.' 2°  Investment  banks generally  do
not verify  the  information  they  receive  in  preparing  their  opinions;' 2'
rather, they premise their opinions on the assumption that the informa-
tion given to them is accurate and complete.' 2  For this reason as well,
fairness  opinions will  tend to remain pro-management  in character.
In  light  of  these  residual  problems,  the  question  arises  whether
courts should simply ignore fairness opinions.  We think not:  for all their
problems,  fairness  opinions  have a positive potential.  Although invest-
ment banks retain some discretion, many prices will clearly fall inside or
outside specified reasonable price ranges and banks will  thus have to find
those prices fair or unfair,  Even though investment banks  will have in-
centives  to develop  pro-management  reputations, if they are too blatant
about it, they will risk losing credibility  with the  courts.  Therefore,  as
117.  Such incentives would  be especially strong for investment  banks that specialize  in writing
fairness opinions.  Those banks would derive a significant part of their revenues from these opinions.
A reputation  for not agreeing  with managers would go to the heart of their business.
118.  See  ag.,  Crouse-Hinds  Co. &  Belden  Corp., supra  note  9,  exhs.  C, D (both  investment
banks, in preparing  their fairness opinions, held discussions with management  about future business
prospects).
119.  See, e.g.,  Alleghany Corp. & Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., supra note 9, annex III (Mer-
rill  Lynch using internal  forecasts in developing  its  fairness opinion).
120.  One commentator has proposed  that directors  should  be under a duty to convey  accurate
information to investment  banks.  See Note, supra note  12,  at  132-33.  Such  a rule might  prevent
outright  lies, but not more subtle forms of bias.
121.  See, ,,g.,  Crouse-Hinds Co.  & Belden Corp., supra note 9,  exhs. C,  D: Alleghany  Corp. &
Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., supra note 9, annexes  III,  IV (no independent verification of infor-
mation provided by the company); see also Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard  Corp.,  388 F. Supp.
812,  822  (D.  Del.  1974)  (investment  bank  relied  on  management  valuation  of timber assets  and
conducted  no independent  evaluation).
122.  See, eg.,  Crouse-Hinds Co.  & Belden Corp., supra note 9. exhs.  C,  D: Alleghany Corp.  &
Investors  Diversified Servs.  Inc.. supra note  9. annexes III,  IV.FAIRNESS OPINIONS
long as excessive judicial reliance  on fairness opinions  is avoided,  such
opinions do have the potential for serving a useful function.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to analyze the problems with
fairness opinions and to suggest a judicial approach  for evaluating  such
opinions.  Fairness  opinions are problematic because  investment banks
have  substantial discretion in rendering such opinions.  The banks'  dis-
cretion derives from two  sources:  first, the concept  of fair value is not
clearly defined, and banks can thus choose among several proposed defi-
nitions of fairness; second, the subjective nature of the estimation process
creates discretion in measuring fair price, however it is defined.
Investment  banks  face  conflicts  of interest  that lead  them to use
their discretion to render pro-management  fairness opinions.  For one,
pro-management opinions generally increase banks'  revenue.  Such opin-
ions make banks more likely to receive contingent fees or, where a bank
does not receive  a contingent fee, generate further work.  Furthermore,
rendering pro-management opinions will help banks to retain and attract
clients.  These incentives are  enhanced by psychological  and social loy-
alty that some bankers may feel towards managers.  Neither the desire to
preserve a professional reputation nor the presence of internal procedures
will significantly reduce these problems.
To deal with these problems, we rec'ommend an approach that helps
courts  to scrutinize  definitions  of fair price,  the measurement  of fair
price, and the company-banker relationship.  First, courts should develop
a definition of fair price that they consider proper.  Investment banks, in
turn, should  disclose  their definitions  of fair price.  Second,  to reduce
discretion in the measurement of fair price, the weight given to a fairness
opinion should depend on whether the opinion contains information  on
the range of fair prices and on the sensitivity of the price estimate.  Third,
courts should  discount fairness  opinions when the writing bank is com-
pensated by a contingent fee, when it is involved in other aspects of the
transaction,  and when it has had prior dealings with the company at is-
sue.  This discounting will reduce incentives for rendering  pro-manage-
ment opinions.  In  any  case,  since  the recommended  approach  would
reduce,  but  not  eliminate,  discretion  and  pro-management  incentives,
courts should exercise substantial  caution in assessing and giving weight
to fairness opinions.
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